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MÁRIA  LACKÓ
The paper disputes the frequently presented and quoted statement that
in post-socialist economies data on power consumption are better
indicators for aggregate output changes than data on official GDP.
Attempt is made to show that the variation of electricity intensities in
post-socialist countries does not necessarily reflect the growth of the
hidden parts of the economy. Statistical and econometric analysis of
data for 18 post-socialist economies show that in this region, the
differences in measured and registered structural changes are more
important factors explaining the differences in the changes of
electricity intensity than the changing size of the unofficial economy.
Introduction
The hidden economy is universal, it is present in any economic system, in
developed market economies, in the socialist/post-socialist countries and in
developing economies. In spite of such a universality the direct causes of the
hidden economies in the different systems are different.
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In the  developed market economies the main factors affecting the
hidden economy are: high tax-rates, the burden of regulation by the state,
varying possibilities of employment for the labor in the official economy and
low tax-morality.
In the  developing countries the causes are the same, though their
weights are different: the determinant is the lack of opportunities for the
agents to participate in the official business and labor market.
The causes of emergence and perpetuation of the hidden economy in
socialist economies were entirely different from those in market economies.
In fact, the habitual factors of market economies could not be significant in
the socialist environment because of the extreme narrow scope of formal
taxation and the full employment of the labor force. Major factors triggering
the expansion of the hidden economy in socialist countries were the pressure
of permanent shortages, the negligible size of the legal private economy, the
low level of services provided by the sate, and the lack of competition
(Kornai, [1992]).
In the post-socialist system, a gradual restructuring of the factors that
trigger the hidden activities takes place: the factors that had been
characteristic of the socialist system lose importance, while those
characterizing the market system gain ground. Major new developments, like
disappearance of shortages, the emergence of competition, a gradually
expanding market of services, and the growing role of the legal private
economy (Kornai [1995]) all lead to the disappearance of the earlier causes of
hidden economy and give way to the traditional causes present in market
economies like the gains of tax evasion, and of the black labor of
unemployed and other inactive people.
In the course of gradual restructuring also the financial discipline an tax
discipline develop slowly.
"In the socialist system discipline was enforced by the bureaucracy itself,
many times with arbitrary and brutal means" ( Kornai [1993], p. 326.).3
Distrust and indifference towards the state characterized the behavior of the
citizens. In the early 1990s, in the course of the transition process the means
of enforcement have gradually changed to those of the constitutional state.
However, to establish trust in the state takes much longer time than changing
the regulatory system. ( Kornai [1992], [1993]). As a consequence of
economic liberalization and continuing distrust in the state the scale of hidden
activities economy has grown fast in these economies.
In the literature of transition the size of the hidden economy has got a
prominent place, and that for several reasons: first, the size of the hidden
economy has far reaching consequences for the actual, as opposed to
registered, rate of output decline, and second, the pervasiveness of hidden
activities greatly determines the size of the missing revenues from the
government budget in the times when stabilization endeavor seeks all
possible sources of budgetary revenues.
Once as student and later as colleague and friend of János Kornai I got
acquainted with the characteristic features of socialist and the post-socialist
economies under his guidance. One of the general principles that I learned
from him during these 28 years was that for the description, analysis and
understanding of the economic phenomena measurement is indispensable,
even in the case of arcane concepts such as the hidden economy.
The measurement of the size of hidden economy has not been solved
in any economic system, let alone for the post-socialist economies. Many
estimations methods have been established and applied that have produced
results that support, complement, but many times contradict to each other. A
consensus about the reliable and acceptable approaches is far from being
established.
In this study I deal with such methods of estimation of the hidden economy
which rely to a great extent on aggregate electricity consumption data. The
application of these methods has got widespread, and its results frequently
cited in the transition literature. Following the presentation of the method
devised by Dobozi and Pohl [1995] and Kaufmann [1995], I show why these4
methods are inappropriate for measuring the hidden economy in the post-
socialist economies. At the end of the paper, as an alternative, I briefly
present my own model which is based (partly) on the development of the
residential electricity consumption instead of aggregate electricity
consumption.
1. The method of Dobozi and Pohl to measure the change of size of the
hidden economy
In 1995, two supplementary papers were published in the newsletter
Transition with talkative titles: Real Output Decline in Transition Economies
– Forget GDP, Try Power Consumption Data! ( Dobozi and  Pohl, [1995]);
and Electricity Consumption and Output Decline – An  Update ( Dobozi
[1995]).
In these papers the authors, Dobozi and Pohl claim that in the post-
socialist countries, especially in the case of countries of former Soviet Union
(FSU) the statistically registered drop in GDP after 1989 exaggerates the
actual decline, possibly by a very large margin. They state that in market
economies, aggregate economic activity and electric power consumption
usually move in lockstep (with an electricity-GDP elasticity close to one).
Data for post-socialist countries do not show the same pattern, and the huge
differences between the electric power consumption and GDP  cannot be
explained rationally across post-socialist countries but only by a rapid growth
of the hidden economies. The papers of Dobozi and Pohl have not remained
without effects: they have became returning motives of serious written
analyses ( Transition Report [1995], EBRD, for example) and of noted
conferences dealing with post-socialist transition.
In the period 1989–1994, in Eastern European transition economies
(with the possible exception of the Czech Republic) the cumulative decline in5
power consumption closely matches the drop in GDP, yielding an electricity-
GDP elasticity of about 1 (meaning that 1 percent GDP fall was associated
with about 1 percent drop in electricity consumption). As Dobozi and Pohl
write:"Even in those East-European countries where the economic structure
and product lines changed drastically, as in Poland, the correlation between
power use and economic activity remained fairly close." ( Dobozi and Pohl
[1995] p.10.)
In most FSU countries however, the reported output declines are
completely inconsistent with the power consumption trends; thus, according
to Dobozi and Pohl, the reliability of official statistics has to be seriously
questioned. The gap between increasing electricity consumption  and falling
GDP can only be explained by gross underreporting of GDP. In the period
1989 and 1994, output downturn in Russia and Ukraine may have been
inflated by official statistics more than twofold, in Azerbaijan as much as
threefold, and in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Moldova by 50 to 90
percent.
Several factors distort official statistics, such as:
– widespread underreporting of output in order to avoid high taxes,
– over-representation of large state-owned industrial enterprises that are
undergoing major   retrenchment, and
– shortcomings of data collection in capturing ever increasing private
activities. (Dobozi [1995] p. 19.)
2. The Kaufmann-method
Based on the above considerations, D. Kaufmann [1995] already reported
some concrete calculations concerning how, with what speed and to what size
the hidden economy grew in the Ukraine between 1989 and 1994.6
"To measure overall economic activity in an economy, electric power
consumption is usually the single-best physical indicator of economic
activity. Overall economic activity and electricity consumption have been
empirically observed throughout the world to move in lockstep – with an
electricity/GDP elasticity close to one ( Dobozi and Pohl [1995]). For the
specific case of economies in transition a careful consideration of all special
features (very low electricity prices, with gradual adjustment upward;
untapped efficiency improvement potential; and restructuring towards less
electricity intensive activities) suggests that on balance electricity efficiency
per unit of overall GDP may increase somewhat overtime (i.e. there may be
less than unitary elasticity during the transition). While still being a good
proxy, this means that the changes in electricity consumption may to some
extent underestimate the changes in overall GDP.
On the basis of the substraction of the two variables measuring overall
and official GDP, respectively, we can arrive an estimate of the unofficial
economy. If the estimate of changes of overall GDP, approximated by the
rate of change of electric power consumption, is somewhat underestimated, it
means that the unofficial economy will also be somewhat underestimated.
Consequently, this estimate of the unofficial economy (derived by subtracting
the proxy for the overall economy from official GDP, if biased, is likely to be
a conservative estimate." (Kaufmann [1995] p.1.)
As a starting point of estimating the size of the unofficial economy in
Ukraine  Kaufmann  uses the results of the well-known Berkeley-Duke
research on the Second Economy of the USSR ( Alexeev  at al., [1987])
conducted during the late 1980's. These estimates roughly range between 8%
and 16% of the total economic activity. Thus, for purposes of his calculation,
Kaufmann uses the midpoint estimate of 12%, assuming that this share of all
the economic activities had been unofficial in 1989.
The next step in his calculation is to derive the figures for the  overall
GDP proxy, based on overall electricity consumption. He also computes the
growth indices of official GDP.7
The figures in  Table 1  are Kaufmann's proxy variables for the
calculations on the overall and official GDP, respectively. They incorporate
the baseline 1989 estimate for the unofficial economy of 12%.  Table 2
presents Kaufmann's calculations on the evolution of the Ukrainian unofficial
economy during the period 1989–1994 in index numbers, starting with 12.0
in 1989 (since base index is 100.0 for the overall economy). The first and
third rows come from the calculations in  Table 1, while the second row
(unofficial economy) is the difference between the third and first rows.
From Table 2 it can be seen that
– by 1994 the unofficial economy tripled, while the official economy
contracted to less than half the size it was in 1989;
– the decline in overall economy since 1989 was one-quarter, which while
significant, is still less than half the decline derived from official statistics.
The decline in the official economy was mitigated by the rapid growth in
the unofficial economy during the period.
On the basis of Table 2 Kaufmann calculates the relative shares of the
official and unofficial  economies. According to  Table 3 , by 1994 the
estimated share of the unofficial economy in the overall Ukrainian economy
was 48.1%. Kaufmann adds that this result is consistent with micro-survey
estimates.
The above described estimation method of the unofficial economy is
very simple, and appealing. However, as  Dobozi and  Pohl confess
themselves, there are people who are skeptic towards this method: "Although
our article was generally welcomed as being on the right track to obtain more
reliable – and certainly low-cost – estimates of the extent of output
retrenchment during the systemic transition, some skeptics argued that while
power consumption and economic activity tend to move in tandem in market
economies, it may not be relevant for transition economies that are
experiencing rapid and massive structural changes. Many argue, that the
increase in electricity consumption may reflect structural movement toward8
higher electricity intensity in GDP." (Dobozi [1995] p.19.)
Under the impact of criticism, in his recent calculations with his c o-
authors (Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997]), Kaufmann eases the strict
assumption of unit elasticity. According to his new concept he assumes an
elasticity of 0.9 for Eastern-European countries, 1 for the Baltic countries and
1.15 for CIS countries. With this modification, he and his co-authors use his
method described above for estimating the hidden economy already for 17
countries. His results are presented in Table 4.
The author of this paper keeps belonging to the skeptics, despite the
fact that she agrees with the approach that uses indicators of electricity
consumption for the estimation of the share of hidden economy in GDP. In
fact, in an other paper she also worked out an estimation method for this
purpose, a method that is suitable for international comparison, and which
extensively makes use of the indicators of electricity consumption.
My skepticism derives from several factors. One cannot avoid asking:
how is it possible that, according to the calculations of Kaufmann, the hidden
economy didn't grow in Romania or Uzbekistan during the years of
transition, while in other countries the size of hidden activities seems to grow
rapidly? It is also surprising that in 1994 and 1995 the ratio of the hidden
economy to GDP is much smaller in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.
Likewise, this ratio also seems to be too low in Poland if compared to other
reform countries, and to anecdotal evidence.
  The second kind of doubt derives from the examination of Finland's
case. In the early 1990s, Finland, just like the East European economies,and
to some extent due to similar factors experienced a significant fall of the
GDP.
Between 1990 and 1993 in Finland the GDP decreased by 13.6%,
while electricity consumption, far from decreasing, increased by 5.5%.
The growth of electricity intensity in Finland in 1990–1993 was 22%,
not much less than the average of the 18 post-socialist countries in 1989–
1994, 32%, but far larger than the average of the East European and Baltic9
countries in 1989–1994, 8.3%. Do the similarities suggest that just like in the
transition economies Finland's growth of electricity intensity can also be
explained by the sudden jump of the hidden economy? To see whether this
can be true, let's carry out the same calculation for Finland that Kaufmann did
for Ukraine. The initial share of the unofficial economy which is relevant for
1990 (10.0%), was taken from my own estimation (Lackó [1996]).
According to this calculation, the share of the hidden economy in
Finland would increase from 10% to 27% in three years, i.e. its relative size
would fast triple! We get a similarly surprising and unrealistic result if the
starting share is 5% instead of 11%. In that case the share of the hidden
economy in 1993 would be 23%, which would mean an even more radical
change, since the result would be more than for times the size of the starting
value.
The results cited above are astonishing and, given all the general
knowledge about Finland, cannot be true. The above calculation was
presented in order to show that the method by which the results were derived
is rather debatable.
In fact, the growth of electricity intensity in Finland is connected with
the normal effects of recessions rather than the expansion of the unofficial
economy: in recessions electricity consumption decreases not as much as the
GDP because the fixed (overhead) electricity use, does not contract in
proportion with the drop in general capacity utilization.
This effect is also mentioned by Dobozi and Pohl when they discuss
electricity intensity of countries in transition, however, they add: "It is
plausible to assume that the consumption-increasing effect of this factor was
largely offset by the combined impact of higher electricity tariffs and shifts in
the output mix away from heavy industry." (Dobozi and Pohl [1995] p.18.)
In the following I will show that in the 18 post-socialist countries
under investigation it is mainly the differences in the size of structural
changes of the economy that determine the differences in changes of
electricity intensity.10
3. Analysis of changes in electricity intensity in 18 post-socialist countries
in the period 1989–1994
It is obvious that at times of recession, due to smaller than usual capacity
utilization, electricity intensity grows, as we saw in Finland's case. In post-
socialist countries, however, additional factors are also present. According to
OECD experts (Electricity in European Economies in Transition.  OECD
[1994]), in individual countries of East Europe, but particularly in FSU
countries since 1990  the industrial sector has largely maintained its level of
energy consumption, despite the fact that industrial production, in value-
added terms, has fallen substantially. Reasons for this included the following:
(a) – the share of industrial output represented by energy intensive basic
industries, including energy-industry, has actually increased;
(b) – inefficient plants have not been closed, but instead have operated at
lower partload efficiencies. According to Roxburgh and Shapiro [1996] in
Russia, because of the Excess Wages Tax, which actually is an
employment subsidy, unemployment is internal to the enterprise: this gives
a strong incentive for the firm to retain excess workers on low wages
rather than making them redundant. This kind of tax influences not only
state-owned firms but also privatized ones, moreover, it was found, that
privatized firms made fewer workers redundant than state owned
companies ( Standing [1994]). According to the calculation made by  D.
Kaufmann [1995] , the rate of the hidden unemployment in Ukraine is 35
%. Internal unemployment most probably lead to higher electricity
intensity in the industry that if it would be external one.
(c) – electricity price rises have been limited in real terms, and nominal
price adjustments have often been accompanied by consumers' refusals to
pay;
(d) – little or no investments have been made in new plants to improve11
electricity efficiency;
(e) – the decision-makers' ability to evaluate the energy use implications of
their investment choices is lacking. Under the centralized economic
system, decision on investments into fixed assets were based primarily on
the available production capacity and plan targets for physical output, with
little emphasis on productivity or efficiency. This legacy has produced
industrial enterprise managers largely unfamiliar with cost accounting
procedures.
Based on this list of specific factors that determine electricity use in
post-socialist economies we may assume that it is the rate at which structural
changes take place in the individual post-socialist countries that will mostly
explain the differences in the growth of electricity intensity across these
economies. In the following I investigate this problem with the help of a
cross-sectional examination of 18 post-socialist countries. Already at this
point I would like to emphasize that I don't exclude the possibility, that also
the growth of the hidden economy influences the growth of electricity
intensity. I only claim that the method initiated by  Dobozi,  Pohl and
Kaufmann is not the right one to apply for the periods and the economies that
these authors wanted to use their method for.
In my analysis three different indicators of structural change are
defined:
1. The change in the share of industry in the production of GDP between
1989 and 1994: ind (measured in percentage point)
2. The difference between the decrease of electricity consumption in industry
and the decrease of total electricity consumption in 1989–1993: d
(percentage point)
3. The maximal rate of unemployment between 1989 and 1994: u (percent)
We assume that the larger structural changes took place in a particular
economy, i.e. the faster the dismantling of industries of socialist type was
carried out, the less growth in electricity intensity occurred. More precisely:12
– the more the value added of the industrial branches decreases
compared to the official GDP, the less growth in electricity intensity occurs,
– the more the electricity consumption in industrial branches decreases
in comparison to total electricity consumption, the more pronounced shift
occurs from highly electricity intensive branches to branches with less
electricity intensity, and therefore the less the electricity intensity of the
economy grows;
– the higher the rate of unemployment, which is to a high degree
structural unemployment, the larger structural changes happened in respect
with the dismantling of industry of socialist type and therefore the slower the
rise of electricity intensity in the economy.
Table 5 shows the average size of the individual structural indicators
for the different groups of countries. In the last column the average change in
electricity intensity is presented. The table shows that for the East-Central
European countries each indicator of structural change is 1.6 - 2 times as
large as the average indicator of the full sample of 18 countries, the indicators
of the Baltic Countries are similar to the total average, while the indicators of
the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States are half as large as the
average indicators. In the last column of the table, it can also be noticed that
in line with our assumption the bigger the structural change, the less is the
growth of electricity intensity.
The regularity which is suggested by the interrelations of the country
group averages, i.e. that the development of electricity consumption is
significantly influenced by the scale of structural changes, is now subjected to
a more exact econometric analysis. Let's look first at the correlation between
the indicators of the individual countries.
From Table 6 we can see that there is a close positive relationship
between the change of electricity consumption and the change of the official
GDP. We find also an interesting relation between two indicators of
structural change: the larger the decrease of the share of industrial branches
within the official GDP, the larger the rate of unemployment.13
The table also shows an important correlation between the change of
the official GDP and the structural indicator measured by the electricity
consumption: the less the electricity consumption in industrial branches
decreases in comparison with total electricity consumption, in other words
the smaller the structural change in this field, the larger fall is experienced in
the official GDP. We have to be careful with the interpretation of this result.
If electricity consumption in the industrial branches contained an increasing
share of unregistered elements compared to that contained in total electricity
consumption, then it would give sufficient explanation for a larger decline in
the official GDP. In this case the growth in total electricity intensity would
indeed be caused by the growth of the hidden economy. However this
assumption is most probably not well founded: if the electricity consumption
due to non-registered production is in the industrial branches large and
growing then at least the same would apply to the total electricity
consumption, since trade and service activities are much easier to keep
unregistered.
From Table 6 it is evident that the growth of electricity intensity is
correlated with the measure of structural changes related to electricity
consumption in industry: the less the decrease in electricity consumption in
the industrial branches compared to total electricity consumption, the more
the electricity intensity increases.
4. Econometric analysis
In the following we formulate our hypothesis in an equation and attempt at
verifying it with a cross-section econometric estimation.
Equation (1) expresses our already sketched hypothesis, that in
addition to the changes of the official GDP, it is the scale of the three kinds of
structural changes that determine total electricity consumption. With this, of
course, we do not state that the growth of unofficial economy doesn't14
influence electricity consumption or the growth of total GDP. We only state
that the difference between the shifts in electricity consumption and the
change of the official GDP is not that mystic and hidden, and it shows a
strong relation to the scale of structural changes.
The equation is as follows:
    dei = d1 dgdpi + d2 indi + d3 di + d4 ui + d5                           (1)
          d1>0      d2>0      d3>0    d4<0
where
dei: the change in electricity consumption between 1989 and 1994
dgdpi: the change of the official GDP between 1989 and 1994
indi: the change of the share of industry in the production of GDP between
1989 and 1994
ui: the maximal rate of unemployment between 1989 and 1994
di: the difference between the change of electricity consumption in the
industrial branches and the change in total electricity consumption, 1898-
1993
i: country indicator. The countries are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
In Table 7 the results of the econometric estimations are shown. The
estimations were carried out with the ordinary least squares method, based on
the cross-sectional data of 18 countries. The estimation was carried out in
different variants (see Table 7). The signs of the parameters are mostly as
expected, and the indicators of fitting are acceptable. In the course of the
estimation, three dummy-variables were used for the countries Romania,
Georgia and Uzbekistan. Beside the structural shifts across sectors that are
taken into account in equation (1), Romania's special feature was the
structural change that took place  within the industry. In the mid-1980-s,
Romania had by far the largest petrochemical sector in Eastern Europe.
Between 1989 and 1992 this industrial branch virtually collapsed: its output
decreased by 50 %. Due to the high electricity use in petrochemical industries
this single specific development has contributed to the decline in Romania's15
total electricity intensity to a large extent.( Electricity Policies of Romania,
OECD 1993)
In the case of Uzbekistan it is also the heritage from the past that
explains its outlier position.
During the Soviet era, Uzbekistan became the cotton-growing center
of the former Soviet Union. The development of basic industries was
neglected and the republic was among the least industrialized ones in the
USSR (Ebel, 1997). Cotton accounts for 70 % of the country's exports, and
50% of its GDP. Exactly because of this reliance on a single commodity,
Uzbekistan was barely struck by the transitional recession, and the country's
electricity intensity did not grow either. The latter was also connected with
the fact that Uzbekistan alone from all the republics of the former Soviet
Union managed to increase its oil and gas production in the first years of
transition. Therefore, currently has control over more energy sources capable
of substituting for electricity, than before transition.
  Georgia's special situation can be explained by the conflicts and wars
in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia which lasted until 1994 and paralyzed the
economy.
In estimation A1 we haven't yet taken into account the differences in
the scale of structural changes across the countries. According to the results
obtained here a 1% decrease of GDP was accompanied on average by a 0.5%
decrease in electricity consumption in the 18 post-socialist countries. In fact,
this estimation does not help the analysis, it only describes the investigated
event.
In estimations B1, C1 and D1 we included the three different structural
indicators individually. In all three cases the sign of the structural parameter
showed up as expected, however, the significance of the parameter in
estimation C1 is not appropriate. The reason for this is the multicollinearity
caused by the close negative correlation between the variables gdpi and di.
The fitting of the equation improved in all three cases in comparison to
estimation  A1, with the most spectacular improvement in the case of the
indicator of the rate of unemployment (estimation D1).16
The parameter of the rate of unemployment is significantly negative.
The negative sign is as expected, since we assumed that larger unemployment
indicates a larger scale of structural changes, which, ceteris paribus, reduces
electricity consumption.
The assumption of a negative sign here is not, however, evident at all:
we could have assumed and obtained a positive sign likewise due to the
widely known close relationship of the size of the hidden economy and the
level of unemployment. It is a tendency in developed market economies that
the larger the rate of unemployment, the larger the size of the hidden
economy.
This process in which the pool of the unemployed strengthens the
activities in the hidden economy will most probably gradually become more
pronounced in the Eastern European countries. Inactive members of the
families start to participate intensively in the hidden economy, and through
this, contribute to the increase of electricity consumption and intensity. This
growth of electricity intensity is blurred by the effect of the structural
changes, which is characterized by the reduction of the usual role of socialist
heavy industry, and the subsequent cut in electricity intensity. According to
our calculations, from the two effects in the period 1989–1994 , structural
changes turned out to be more powerful: this is shown by the significantly
negative parameter in equations D1, E1 and F1.
In estimation E1 we found some genuinely interesting results. If there was no
difference between the 18 post-socialist countries' speed of structural change,
then GDP and electricity consumption would really closely move together
(value of parameter belonging to variable dgdpi: 1.00).
In estimation F1 all three structural indicators are presented. Here, due to the
close negative relation between indi and ui, multicollinearity arose.
Because of the multicollinearity between dgdpi and di equation (1) had to be
reformulated and reestimated. The new function, equation (2), the dependent
variable is the change of electricity intensity which is the function of the
indicators of structural change.
            dinti = Q1 indi + Q2 di + Q3 ui + Q4                          (2)17
                   Q1>0     Q2>0     Q3<0
where
dinti: the change of electricity intensity between 1989 and 1994
We did a couple of estimations for equation (2), the results of which
are shown in Table 8. In these estimations the parameters proved to be
significant and got the expected signs (except that of the variable indi in
estimation F2 because of multicollinearity). The most satisfactory result came
out of estimation D2, where no multicollinearity distorted the estimated
parameters.
From the results of estimation we can draw the conclusion that if there
had not been a radical structural change in the official economy in Eastern
Europe, then the growth of electricity intensity would have been larger, since
the economic structure inherited from the past used a large amount of
electricity even in the case when production was falling. We can formulate
this also the opposite way: if there had been powerful structural changes in
the official economy of the CIS countries, then the growth of electricity
intensity would have been far less then experienced recently. Even within
Eastern Europe differences can be seen in respect to structural changes in the
official economy. For instance, in Slovakia structural changes, such as the
cuts in the production of metallurgy and other heavy industries that were
triggered by the shifts in demand, combined with the high unemployment
caused the fast decline in the country's electricity intensity in 1993–1994.
This was the reason for the larger decrease of electricity intensity in Slovakia
than in the Czech Republic and not a smaller and more rapidly decreasing
hidden economy, as implied by the estimation of  Kaufmann  and his co-
authors (see Table 4).
At the end of our econometric analysis we return to the case of Finland
to check the applicability of our results to this specific country. Our question
is the following: How big is the difference between estimation and reality, if
we estimate Finland's change of electricity intensity with the estimation
results of equation (2) (i.e. with the parameters that were deducted from the
analysis of 18 post-socialist economies) ?18
During the recession of 1990–1993 in Finland the rate of
unemployment increased with 14.3 percentage points, electricity
consumption in the industrial branches increased by 3.6%, while total
electricity consumption increased by 5.7%; accordingly the value of the
variable di is -2.1. If we put these numbers into equation (2), and use the
parameters produced by estimation D2, we get an estimation of 20.2%
increase of electricity intensity for Finland. The real increase of electricity
intensity was 22.3%; the difference between real and estimated change is a
lot smaller than the margin of error of the estimated function. In our equation
the growth of electricity intensity in Finland was explained by the various
structural changes rather then by the explosive growth of the hidden
economy.
Based on the results of the statistical analysis and the econometric
estimations in sections 3 and 4 we feel that our hypothesis has been proved: it
is the structural changes which take place in the countries with different
speed, that is decisive in the development of electricity intensity. We don't
exclude that the fast growth of the hidden economy does influence the growth
of electricity intensity: we just state that from the usual aggregate data it is
very hard to draw conclusions for the growth of the hidden economy.
5. Residential electricity and hidden economy – description of a new
 method
As already written in the Introduction, the hidden economy is present in any
economic system. We may add here that in each economy hidden activities
play a role in each sector of the economy, including the industry, trade and
other services, even households.
In other papers of mine (Lackó [1995], [1996], [1998]) I analyzed the
size of hidden activities present in households in a cross section of countries
and used these results for the estimation of the volume of hidden activities on
the national level. That model utilized the data of residential electricity
consumption, a part of aggregate electricity consumption. In the following I19
briefly summarize this model. The method helps to establish share of the
hidden economy in different countries in a given period (I made calculations
for 20 OECD economies and some post-socialist countries). It does not
attempt to calculate the growth of the hidden economy, an in this respect it is
not comparable with the  Dobozi–Pohl–Kaufmann  calculations. My model
would be capable for the measurement of the growth too, but at this stage the
unavailability of the necessary data prevents this exercise.
An advantage of the model based on residential electricity
consumption is that it relies in meso-level analysis, i.e. the investigation of
the behavior of households. This way it can ignore the substantial differences
in the macro-structure of the different economies, and the impact shifts in this
macro-structure on the electricity consumption, and through this, on the
hidden economy.
The use of households as the level of analysis is beneficial also for
another reason. One characteristic feature of economic transition in Eastern
Europe is the mushrooming of small private business, which is set up
practically in family-household framework. In this milieu this fast growing
economic activity can easily operate mostly hidden from state registration.
The method is based on an econometrically tested model which uses
data of developed market economies. Subsequently, the estimations of the
size of the hidden economy in the socialist-post-socialist countries needed
some modifications according to the specificity of this system.
The first premise for the model was that in each country a part of the
household consumption of electricity is used in the hidden economy. We
asserted that the electricity consumption of households in a country was
determined not only by such visible factors as the size of the population, the
level of development, the country's geographical location (climate and
weather), the relative price of electricity, and access to other energy sources,
but also by the extent of the hidden economy.
In the model the hidden economy is represented by three proxy
variables: the tax/GDP ratio, the inactive/active labor ratio and the ratio of
public social welfare expenditures to GDP.  The first two proxies represent20
well-known relationships: the higher these ratios the higher the share of the
hidden economy. The third indicator is related to the enforcement of taxes:
the higher the third ratio, the stronger efforts are made by the state to collect
outstanding taxes.
The parameters of the model were estimated by a cross-section of the
countries in different variants: (1) for 19 OECD countries in 1990, (2) for 19
OECD countries in 1989 and (3) through a panel data base made up of the
data for 1989-1990. The estimated parameters were significant, the signs
coincided with the expected ones. Accordingly, the results supported our
assumptions about the determinants of household electricity consumption,
including the impact of the hidden economy.
After the estimation of the parameters of the model residential
electricity consumption could be decomposed to two parts with the help of
which indicators were created for each country showing the per capita
household consumption of electricity related to the hidden economy as a
share of total per capita household electricity consumption. This calculation
was carried out not only for 19 OECD countries but, following some
necessary modification, also for some East-European countries (Hungary,
Poland). The parameters obtained for the developed market economies were
applied for these post-socialist economies to establish that part of  household
electricity consumption which was independent of the hidden economy. After
subtracting this part of the consumption from the actual electricity
consumption we got to the share of household electricity consumption used in
the hidden economy in total household electricity consumption. As this
sequence of calculations shows the proxies characterizing determinants of the
hidden economy in developed market economies were not used here.
The results of this exercise aimed to determine the contribution of the
hidden economy to GDP in the individual countries. However without the
knowledge of how much GDP is produced by one unit of electricity in the
hidden economy of each country the share of the hidden economy in the GDP
can not be calculated. Since data for the per unit use of electricity in the
hidden economy is unavailable an indirect conversion methods had to be21
used.
This method was rather rudimentary: the results of one of the
estimations known from the literature were taken (a calculation carried out
for a single country for the early 1990s), and the other countries' data (their
index of hidden economy expressed in terms of residential electricity
consumption) were proportioned to this base country.
Table 9 summarizes the results of our estimations. According to the
results of our investigations, in the early phase of transition, the size of the
hidden economy in the investigated post-socialist countries (Hungary,
Poland) is two times larger than in the average of developed market
economies, and much larger than in that developed economy which has the
largest hidden part (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Belgium, Italy).22
6. Summary
This paper disputed the frequently presented and quoted statement, that in
post-socialist economies data on power consumption are better indicators for
aggregate output changes than official GDP. The development of electricity
consumption is allegedly reflecting the combined growth of official and
hidden economies and they tell the true story about decline of output in these
countries between 1989 and 1994.
The authors Dobozi, Pohl and Kaufmann claim, that the statistical drop
in GDP after 1989 in post-socialist countries, especially in the case of
countries of former Soviet Union, exaggerates the actual decline, possibly by
a very large margin. They take it for granted, that in market economies
aggregate economic activity and electric power consumption usually move in
lockstep (with an electricity-GDP elasticity close to one). Since the post-
socialist countries do not show the same pattern, they claim that this feature
can be explained rationally only by a rapid growth of the hidden (unofficial)
economy.
Starting the discussion of the validity of this approach first the
Kaufmann method was applied for Finland, a developed market economy that
suffered an output decline in the early 1990s comparable to that in the post-
socialist economies. The results was such an astonishing, unrealistic implicit
growth of the hidden economy in Finland that had to lead to questioning the
underlying assumptions of the Dobozi–Pohl–Kaufmann approach.
My paper attempts to show that the variation of electricity intensities in
post-socialist countries does not necessarily reflect the growth of the hidden
parts of the economy. Statistical and econometric analysis of data for 18 post-
socialist economies show that the measured and registered structural changes
are sufficient to explain the differences in the changes of electricity intensity
in this region.
In the course of my investigations I have become convinced that using
aggregate electricity consumption data and the assumption of constant
electricity intensity is not the proper way to calculate the size or growth of the23
hidden economy either in mature market economies or in economies in
transition. I have become convinced, however, that other indices (like
residential electricity consumption) and other assumptions lead to more
satisfactory estimations of the size of the hidden economy in developed
market economies and post-socialist countries, as it is showed in my earlier
work (Lackó [1995], [1996], [1998]).24
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Tables
Table 1
Changes in Electricity Consumption (as a proxy of Overall GDP)
and Official GDP in Ukraine, 1989–1994
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Growth rate in Electricity
Consumption
0 -2,2 -6,2 -7,8 -11,7
Electricity Consumption
Index (1989 = 100)
100,0 100,0 97,8 91,7 84,6 74,7
Growth rate in Official GDP -3,8 -13,4 -17,5 -14,9 -24,5
Official GDP Index
(Index 1989 = 88)
88 84,5 73,2 60,4 51,4 38,8
Source: Kaufmann [1995]
Table 2
Evolution of the Official and Unofficial Economy  in Ukraine
 1989–1994, percent
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Official Economy Index 88 84,5 73,2 60,4 51,4 38,8
Unofficial Economy Index 12 15,5 24,6 31,3 33,2 35,9
Overall Economy Index 100 10,0 97,8 91,7 84,6 74,7
Source: Kaufmann [1995]27
Table 3
Relative Shares of Official and Unofficial GDP in Ukraine
 1989–1994, percent
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Official GDP 88 84,5 74,9 65,9 60,8 51,7
Unofficial GDP 12 15,5 25,1 34,1 39,2 48,1
Overall GDP 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Kaufmann [1995]
Table 4
Share of the unofficial economy in total GDP, 1989–95,
selected transition economies (in percent)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Azerbaijan 12,0 21,9 22,7 39,2 51,2 58,0 60,6
Belarus 12,0 15,4 16,6 13,2 11,0 18,9 19,3
Bulgaria 22,8 25,1 23,9 25,0 29,9 29,1 36,2
Czech Republik 6,0 6,7 12,9 16,9 16,9 17,6 11,3
Estonia 12,0 19,9 26,2 25,4 24,1 25,1 11,8
Georgia 12,0 24,9 36,0 52,3 61,0 63,5 62,6
Hungary 27,0 28,0 32,9 30,6 28,5 27,7 29,0
Kazakhstan 12,0 17,0 19,7 24,9 27,2 34,1 34,3
Latvia 12,0 12,8 19,0 34,3 31,0 34,2 35,3
Lithuania 12,0 11,3 21,8 39,2 31,7 28,7 21,6
Moldova 12,0 18,1 27,1 37,3 34,0 39,7 35,7
Poland 15,7 19,6 23,5 19,7 18,5 15,2 12,6
Romania 22,3 13,7 15,7 18,0 16,4 17,4 19,1
Russia 12,0 14,7 23,5 32,8 36,7 40,3 41,6
Slovak Republic 6,0 7,7 15,1 17,6 16,2 14,6 5,8
Ukraine 12,0 16,3 25,6 33,6 38,0 45,7 48,9
Uzbekistan 12,0 11,4 7,8 11,7 10,1 9,5 6,5
Source: Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer[1997]28
Table 5
Mean values of the indicators of structural change and electricity
intensity by group of countries
ind d u dint
Central and Eastern Europe -15,9 -18,1 12,3 1,005
Baltic Countries -8,3 -9,3 4,7 1,237
Commonwealth of
Independent States
-3,5 -7,0 2,6 1,550
Total -8,4 -11,0 6,2 1,320
Source: own calculations
Table 6
Correlations among the indicators of the countries
dei dgdpi dinti indi ui di
dei 1
dgdpi 0,81 1
dinti -0,5 -0,84 1
indi 0,23 0,13 0,15 1
ui 0,1 0,45 -0,38 -0,75 1
di -0,47 -0,72 0,66 0,32 -0,39 1
Note:
dei – the change in electricity consumption between 1989 and 1994
dgdpi – the change of the official GDP between 1989 and 1994
dinti – the change of electricity intensity between 1989 and 1994
indi – the change of the rate of industry within the GDP
ui – the maximal rate of unemployment between 1989 and 1994
di – the difference between the change of electricity consumption in the




Results of estimation of equation (1)
Dependent variable: dei









































































2 0,627 0,76 0,69 0,902 0,936 0,933
F 29,57 11,84 8,43 32,28 42,5 34,83
Standard error of
regression
0,0845 0,067 0,078 0,0434 0,035 0,036
Mean of dependent
variable
0,7236 0,7236 0,7236 0,7236 0,7236 0,723630
Table 8
Results of estimation of equation (2)
Dependent variable: dinti







































































2 0,71 0,9 0,81 0,97 0,85 0,97
F 11,4 37,32 19,53 105,75 20,52 88,96
Standard error of
regression
0,213 0,129 0,171 0,07 0,15 0,07
Mean of dependent
variable
1,3189 1,3189 1,3189 1,3189 1,3189 1,318931
Table 9
The share of the hidden economy in percent of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Poland 30,8 29,7 33,0 33,6 32,8





















  Source: Lackó [1998]